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John Dewey's most intense period of 
work in philosophy of education during and 
immediately after the Chicago years culminated 
in Democracy and Education in 1916. After 
that, he produced fewer writings on education, 
but is still remembered for The Sources of a 
Science of Education, Experience and Education, 
and numerous articles in journals. Yet the 
longest account of philosophy of education after 
Democracy and Education is little known. This 
is a course of lectures on educational philosophy 
given at the University of Cincinnati in 1937, 
two decades after Democracy and Education . A 
stenographic record of the lectures was made, 
which consists of 237 double-spaced typewritten 
pages. Two earlier sets of lectures in philosophy 
of education have survived — one given in 1896, 
the other in 1899. (The 1896, 1899, and 1937 
lectures will be referenced as LI, L2, and L3, 
respectively.) The 1937 course was intensive: 
Dewey lectured for 5 days a week for two weeks 
in the 1937 Summer School, one lecture a day on 
two days, two lectures on each of the remaining 
8 days, for a total of 18 lectures, June 7 to June 
11, and June 14 to June 18. (For purposes of 
reference, the lectures are numbered 1-18; e.g., 
L3,15 means the 1937 lectures, lecture 15. The 
division into sub-headings was made by the 
present writer.) 
One change that had taken place since 
1916 was the growth of philosophy of education 
as a distinct field of study in the United States. 
Prior to 1916, Herman Harrell Home's 
Philosophy of Education in 1904 was probably 
the first textbook by an American author. This 
was followed by John Angus Macvannel's 
Outline of a Course in the Philosophy of 
Education and G. E. Partridge's Genetic 
Philosophy of Education, both published in 
1912. Other writers had entered the scene whose 
writings were on Dewey's reading list in 1937. 
Among them were W. H. Kilpatrick's Education 
for a Changing Civilization, Boyd H. Bode's 
Modern Educational Theories, and John Childs' 
Education and the Philosophy of 
Experimental ism. 
Perhaps the most striking difference 
between L3, on the one side, and LI, L2, and 
Democracy and Education on the other, can be 
seen in the place devoted to a discussion of 
philosophy and philosophy of education. In LI 
and L2 Dewey pays little direct attention to 
discussing the nature of philosophy of education 
but may be said to "do" philosophy of education; 
while in Democracy and Education he "does" 
philosophy of education for 23 chapters, then 
discusses the nature of its subject matter in 
Chapter 24 in relation to philosophy itself. 
However, in 1937, he begins the course by 
devoting the first lecture to the nature of 
philosophy and the second to the nature of 
philosophy of education. He explains this way 
of beginning the course by saying, "I suppose it 
ought to begin with something a little more 
concrete, but this preliminary discussion about 
philosophy in general, the philosophy of 
education in particular, seemed to be rather 
necessary, sort of a framework for the course." 
About his preliminary discussion, Dewey advises 
the students not to take it too seriously but, at the 
same time, "don't forget about it." It is to be 
used in later discussions "to go back to to be 
filled out." "After all," he says, "it is philosophy 
in its bearings upon educational problems that I 
am going to discuss." 
In beginning his discussion of the nature 
of philosophy, Dewey asks what there is about 
philosophy that is not futile, not a purely 
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intellectual exercise, and replies that 
philosophizing is a form of reflective thought 
that comes about in response to social problems. 
The further question to explore is why are there 
problems that require philosophic inquiry distinct 
from scientific inquiry? 
Generally speaking, Dewey holds, 
philosophy arises in a conflict between well-
ingrained customs, traditions, and institutions in 
a social group, and new or unaccustomed ways 
of responding to those ingrained customs. When 
settled conditions continue for long periods and 
become fairly static, there is little 
philosophizing; when different beliefs or changes 
in conditions are introduced, old static conditions 
become unsettled, and problems arise. 
Philosophy is made up of attempts to mediate 
between the previously settled and the now 
unsettled. 
Whatever is customary, traditional, 
settled in a group Dewey calls the common sense 
of the group. It is what "the different members 
of the group take for granted, that is, what they 
accept without much thought, accept it because it 
is there . . . all the members of the group are 
influenced by it, tend to hold it in common." Put 
differently, the beliefs that are held in common 
are the "sense" of the group. The impact of 
modern science has had an unsettling impact on 
what was earlier common sense. Dewey 
contrasts his conception of philosophy as seeking 
action that aims to mediate between the 
previously settled common sense and that which 
unsettles common sense, with conceptions of 
philosophy that "attempt to get a final ultimate 
absolute knowledge of the universe as a 
complete whole." He has little to say about the 
conceptions that attempt to gain "final ultimate 
absolute knowledge." 
Finally, in his opening lecture Dewey 
turns to the question, Why do we need 
philosophy, since the development of the 
sciences appears to take over the province of 
what had previously been philosophy? If 
philosophy is another form of knowledge, then 
the development of the sciences would probably 
make philosophy extinct. Yet there is more in 
life than knowledge, Dewey says - there is 
living itself. And an important part of living is 
the raising of questions about what to do with 
knowledge. For example, "we need human 
beings that have to form principles and aims and 
that have to change the value of this end over 
against that purpose 
. . . that have aims in life both as individuals and 
as groups." In short, philosophy deals with the 
question of aims and values. "Philosophy in my 
mind can never be merged in science just 
because of the fact that as human beings we are 
moved to action, not by knowledge alone but by 
knowledge in connection with our desires, aims, 
purposes, and conceptions of what is 
worthwhile." 
The Nature of Philosophy of Education 
In L3,2 Dewey moves from a discussion 
of philosophy to philosophy of education. He 
thinks that education is more intimately 
connected with the social conditions from which 
philosophy emerges than any other institution. 
He refers to Chapter 24 in Democracy and 
Education where the nature of philosophy of 
education is discussed, pointing out that 
philosophy in its origins in ancient Greece was 
connected closely with educational problems. 
"Education," he says, "is the chief social 
instrumentality for forming a type of human 
beings that carry on the beliefs and traditions of a 
community." He goes on to refer to two facts in 
juxtaposition with one another: (1) the 
conservative character of the school; and (2) the 
changes in social conditions that have forced 
themselves onto the schools. This shows, he 
argues, that schools have had to face the problem 
of the adjustment of older types of schools, 
subject matters, and methods to changing social 
conditions. At the same time, new subject 
matters tend to become dispersive, leading to the 
need to find ways of unifying them. The task of 
philosophy of education is to reflect on the 
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existing situation and attempt to locate and 
describe the sources of the conflict out of which 
problems arise, and then to form ideas of ways 
in which unity may be brought about. "First," he 
says, "to see the school situation in the light of 
the larger social situation, and then secondly to 
form an idea of the way in which the school may 
serve better in the direction of social forces and 
conditions in solving the social problems." 
Going on to say that this is "a general 
formal statement," Dewey attempts to make it 
more concrete by talking about what philosophy 
of education can and cannot do for the teacher. 
What it cannot do, Dewey says, is to give 
teachers "practical recipes" for teaching better. 
What it should do "is to enable the teacher or the 
school administrator to see the special tasks of 
school work in a larger and longer perspective, 
take them out of the narrow day by day setting 
and place them in some kind of a larger 
intellectual and moral scheme, enlarge the 
horizon, broaden the context, the sense of the 
context in which these detailed questions and 
problems arise." He illustrates this idea by 
discussing a "conflict of ends and values 
between the specific and the general." He refers 
to Bode and Kilpatrick who emphasize the 
development of "attitudes" or "dispositions" as 
being a more important aim than acquiring 
specific information. Yet Dewey points out that 
it is important not to oppose these aims to one 
another; rather we need to understand that 
concrete skills and bodies of information are 
means for the creation of general attitudes. 
Eventually Dewey discusses another 
conflict that results in a philosophical problem — 
the relation between theory and practice. He 
notes that much popular literature connects 
"practical" education with being successful in 
one's occupation, and tends to connect 
"practical" with "useful." Instead, Dewey argues 
for "the necessity of broadening the concept of 
practice and practical to include different 
factors, human well being, human welfare." 
The Theoretical and the Practical: Relating 
Child and Curriculum 
In L3,3 Dewey considers the relationship 
between the theoretical and the practical. He 
acknowledges the common tendency to separate 
theory and practice, a dualism that Dewey wants 
us to get over. "The most fundamental problem 
in life," he says, "individually and collectively, 
is to relate theory and practice so that practice is 
intelligent, embodies ideas that are broad and 
comprehensive as possible, while ideas, theories, 
beliefs . . . organize, unify our practical 
activities." Dewey mentions some of the "splits" 
in education: between subjects held to be good 
for intellectual discipline and those that are held 
to be of practical value; between the 
"vocational" and the "academic"; between 
"pure" and "applied" science; and between the 
"humanistic" and the "scientific." 
In this context Dewey returns to his 
earlier point that one task of philosophy of 
education is to locate conflicts that cause 
problems that education needs to face; or that 
ref lect ive thinking "is investigation, 
examination, turning things over, and we don't 
inquire excepting where there is a question." 
What philosophy of education can do for us is to 
make us more aware of underlying problems. 
Dewey raises the question, what is 
education? He responds by saying that he is not 
going to try and give a definition of education at 
this point, holding that valuable definitions come 
at the close of a discussion; they are conclusions 
of inquiry, rather than beginnings. The present 
discussion of what education is is not "an 
attempt to give a final definition but rather to 
indicate some of the factors that enter into it in a 
way that gives a kind of outline map, a series of 
pointer signs." Then he discusses two related 
factors at length. The first is that education is a 
process of motivating individuals' original 
natures and tendencies. Beginning with babies' 
"normal tendencies" education must build on 
them, "to modify them, to give them a turn, a 
direction they don't have originally and don't 
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have when they are left to themselves." Thus 
Dewey makes explicit the idea that children 
cannot be "left to themselves," but need the help 
of persons of more mature experience. The 
second and related factor in educating the young 
is that "giving direction to them leads to certain 
results — takes the form of habit formation." 
Dewey tries to make it clear that what he means 
by this is a wide sense of habit, that which 
includes habits of desire, of purpose, of 
judgment. The aim is for such habits to lead 
youngsters to be able to judge what is 
appropriate or inappropriate in certain situations. 
These are more important than merely "external" 
ways of behaving, for they are the consequence 
of internalizing ways of feeling and thinking. 
With respect to the acquisition of special skills, 
such as in language and arithmetic, Dewey 
argues that these are more meaningful if they are 
acquired as part of activities of desiring, having 
purposes, and making judgments than if they are 
memorized apart from such activities. 
Dewey's refusal to give a definition of 
education in favor of introducing certain 
"factors" is a departure from LI, L2, and 
Democracy and Education . In all three he 
defined education as the reconstruction of 
experience: In LI,2 as a point of departure for 
the rest of the lectures; in L2, following a lecture 
in which he discussed interest, discipline, 
information, and culture; and in Democracy and 
Education in the chapter on "Education as 
Conservative and Progressive," where he 
emphasizes the idea that the character of 
education that reconstruction of experience 
requires is fundamentally different in 
conservative and progressive societies. 
In L3,4 Dewey returns to a matter 
introduced on the previous day, about teachers 
giving direction to children's original tendencies. 
The point is that we have to pay attention to 
them, attempt to find out "what the pupil brings 
with him that the teacher may utilize, and . . . 
how they are to be developed and transformed." 
In the course of this discussion Dewey refers to 
his earlier The Child and the Curriculum, 
pointing out that it is the business of the teacher 
to view students' existing habits, skills, and 
knowledge as potentialities, as "powers that are 
to be put to use." The teacher's problem "is to 
bring about an interaction . . . between the 
powers which the pupil brings with him which 
includes all of his interests, all of his habits, 
skills, knowledge and though t . . . or at least that 
part of him which is relevant to the particular 
subject matter so that . . . some kind of 
transaction takes place." In this way child-and-
curriculum becomes a working relationship, not 
a mere "addition" of curriculum to child. 
Cumulative Activity and Growth 
In L3,6 Dewey comments on some of the 
references on his reading list, saying that it 
doesn't make much difference which books are 
read; the important thing is to make connections 
between them and the subject matter of his 
lectures. He points to Harold Rugg's Culture and 
Education in America and Rugg and Ann 
Shumaker's Child Centered Schools as being 
"partly in line with the general tendency of the 
lectures and partly in opposition." No doubt the 
opposition lay in their emphasis on "child-
centered" schools as compared with Dewey's 
efforts to find a unity of child and society. In 
addition, he refers to works giving accounts of 
schools that attempted to carry out in practice 
some of the ideas in his lectures; among them are 
articles in the Progressive Education journal, his 
and Evelyn Dewey's Schools of Tomorrow, and 
the recently-published book on the University of 
Chicago Laboratory School, The Dewey School 
by Mayhew and Edwards. He says that Bode's 
Conflicting Psychologies of Learning is 
especially relevant to the connection between 
ideas already discussed and "the special problem 
of general training or transfer, carrying over from 
one subject to another." He approaches the 
problem by asking what intellectual conditions 
would provide a reason to expect transfer. His 
reply is, "if there is a certain developing 
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continuous activity where the different . . . 
stages . . . are consciously related to an end in 
view." Dewey elaborates further on what he 
means by a cumulative activity, saying it is when 
one stage leads to the next and that is a 
consequence of what had gone before. It is when 
those engaged in the activity "consciously 
observe the relation of what they were doing at 
the successive stages to the final end" that we 
have reason to think that "general intelligence" 
has had a hand in the activity, and "transfer from 
the intellectual standpoint" has been involved. 
Summing up, "unless thinking and judgment 
enter into the problem of the activity there is no 
reason to expect any transfer," except by 
accident. Dewey says the cumulative activity of 
stimulus and response must be transformed into a 
means-consequences activity. This takes place 
when stimulus-response is not merely a 
consecutive reaction, but one in which 
observation of conditions and actions are 
consciously related to an end in view, and 
actions are deliberately performed as means to 
the consequences that are actually achieved. 
Dewey's characterization of a means-
consequences activity is a way of talking about 
growth. Dewey refers his students to an article 
by Bode, who criticized the conception of 
education as growth, by saying that it does not 
give any criterion for growth, inasmuch as a 
burglar can develop into a better burglar, a 
gangster can "grow" into a better gangster, and 
so on. Dewey asks whether this constitutes a 
fundamental objection to the idea of education as 
growth, or is something the matter with Bode's 
interpretation? The next day (L3,7) Dewey 
returns to Bode's objection, and begins by saying 
that "there is no such thing as one completely 
isolated line or mode of development." If we 
take the example of a burglar who has developed 
into a better burglar, we need to understand that 
it is difficult to imagine anyone who is nothing 
but a burglar. A burglar has potentialities to 
develop in other directions. "The real question," 
Dewey continues, "is whether growth, 
development in the direction of being a burglar 
will assist or retard the development in other 
directions." Development as the end cannot be 
limited to one line of growth. If development 
into a better burglar is the single end and it limits 
development in other directions — e.g., becoming 
a better parent, or a better citizen — "then that 
particular instance is not in accord with the idea 
that growth or development is the continual end." 
Dewey sums up his reply to Bode's criticism in 
this way: "If you really believe that growth or 
development is the end you have got to take it in 
a broad and inclusive sense and not limit it to one 
isolated line of development excluding the effect 
and the bearing of that upon development in 
other directions." 
Dewey moves on to discuss "all-around 
development," by which he means, not the 
development of everything at the same time, but 
a continuing growth in which certain activities 
predominate at certain times, yet "limit on them 
falls into place" in ways such that they can 
become means to other developing activities. 
For example, "receptivity," instead of involving a 
passive attitude on the part of students, is "a 
necessary function which itself involves a kind 
of activity." As an example, he says that it 
requires activity to really listen to what other 
people are saying, to take in what they are 
saying. One who cannot do this limits his own 
growth. Reading is another example if the reader 
is receptive, has "what we call the open mind," a 
willingness to take in. In both examples, 
receptivity involves an activity of taking - not a 
passive receiving but an active taking. 
The Nature of Experience: Heredity and 
Environment 
In L3,8 Dewey discusses the question, 
what is experience? He refers to the empirical 
movement in modern philosophy which 
developed in opposition to the rationalistic 
philosophy. Francis Bacon emphasized 
beginning with first hand experiences of 
sensations and observations over against general 
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participation and common activities by which 
educators establish a more democratic method of 
control. Democracy, Dewey insists, "is radical 
because of its insistence upon democratic means 
to attain democratic ends." The question arises, 
Suppose the democratic faith "becomes smitten," 
should it hope to win out in the long run by 
means of persuasion? Is it permissible for 
democracy to use force in a struggle with non-
democracy? Dewey's reply is, "if one doesn't 
have an absolutistic philosophy then one couldn't 
be an absolutistic pacifist." Although democracy 
must emphasize methods of inquiry and 
persuasion, if the occasion arises, proponents of 
democracy will have to fight for their ideals. 
Dewey then responds to the criticism that 
learning everything through experience "tends to 
weaken our imaginative faculty" by turning to a 
discussion of the place of art in experience. This 
turns on the question, Is art a "normal necessity" 
of growth of experience or is it an "expression"? 
Here Dewey reminds his class of appreciating 
the value of completing an experience, carrying 
it through to a consummatory end. In this sense 
the esthetic element in experience "means simply 
that experiences have attained their fulfillment." 
Dewey uses two words, "artistic" and "esthetic"; 
the former he calls the active, doing side of 
experience, the latter the receptive and "going 
side" of experience. Yet while the two can be 
distinguished from one another, they cannot be 
separated in actual developing experience. Thus 
a natural termination of such an experience is art, 
"an expression of a full experience." This means 
that the artistic attitude and method are not 
confined to painting, sculpting, "fine" literature, 
and the like, but may be part of any sort of 
experience. Not only is an esthetic experience 
the completion of a course of prior experience, 
but it prepares us for subsequent experience. 
At the end of L3,15 Dewey returns to the 
question of subject matter in its social dimension 
and its counterpart in individual experience. He 
says that children in the first grade bring some of 
the curriculum with them. By this he means that 
something in their past experience can be 
connected with school studies. The need for 
joining the social and individual in experience 
means that an essential task of the school is to 
connect the children's own experience (their 
already-existing "curriculum") with kinds of 
subject matter in school that are socially worth 
while. 
Dewey takes up the topic of methods in 
L3,16. He points out that it is not really a new 
topic, being a kind of corollary to what has been 
said about experience in general, about the 
process of doing in relation to the self and 
environment; he aims to make a little more 
articulate some things that were said in passing 
with respect to other topics. The key to the 
nature of method can be found in observing what 
takes place "in any worthwhile experience," e.g., 
children in activities outside of school, adults at 
work in various occupations. An important thing 
is to look for suggestions that increase powers of 
observation and independence, rather than to 
look for "recipes" on method. The more 
articulate plan of method is found in scientific 
method, "tested method." It is the method of 
ordinary experience that has been refined and 
systematized with special reference to the end of 
increasing knowledge. Dewey refers to salient 
points in scientific method, beginning with 
"getting the problem"; then ideas of working on 
the problem grow out of past experience; and 
acting to test the ideas. Next he refers to an idea 
expressed earlier in the course, that "scientific 
knowledge by the action determines the problem 
of end and value" (emphasis is on problem). But 
knowledge in itself does not tell us what we are 
to put knowledge to doing, but requires a sort of 
activity, viz. philosophy, that "takes the best 
knowledge we have . . . relates that to some 
general scheme of directive values and purposes; 
the ends themselves not being fixed but being 
worked out and developed in the light of the 
actual conditions." This means forming 
hypotheses and testing them in the light of 
available evidence. 
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Dewey is saying that a sharp line cannot 
be drawn between science and philosophy, 
inasmuch as the ideas philosophy suggests in 
light of the findings of science themselves need 
to be tried out, as far as conditions permit, 
according to scientific methods of inquiry. Thus 
science results in findings that require a valuing 
of them in terms of hypotheses about what they 
require of us; and in testing the hypotheses we 
generate further conclusions that need the 
attention of philosophical valuing. This is 
clearly another example of the idea of continuity 
of experience. 
Individual and Social: Democracy as a Way of 
Life 
In L3,17 Dewey addresses the 
relationship between the individual and the 
social, pointing out that certain theories find an 
opposition between them. Association, Dewey 
argues, is a basic category of existence, even 
below the human, below the biological level. 
When we consider human beings, we find that 
they are nurtured and developed as members of a 
community. The problem is not to put the 
individual and the social over against one 
another, inasmuch as social relations are 
inevitable, but to find out how to relate various 
individual gifts and capacities to them; and to 
find working relationships between different 
forms of social organization and individuals. 
Genuine individuality, Dewey argues, is itself a 
product of social organization. Individuality, in 
turn, reacts on social institutions and can aim to 
make differences in them. 
Dewey emphasizes a point that he had 
discussed back in 1899 in School and Society. In 
earlier rural, pre-industrial conditions, children 
learned habits of responsibility and relationships 
between occupations of feeding, clothing, and 
sheltering and ways in which the products of 
those occupations affected social-individual life 
by observing and participating in the society's 
occupations along with adults. Schools of the 
time tended to take up "academic work" which 
community activities did not engage in. Thus 
schools separated themselves from society by 
engaging in academic activities while largely 
ignoring those of the community. In the forty 
years between the beginning of the Laboratory 
School in Chicago and 1937, the percentage of 
children attending school and particularly the 
percentage continuing into secondary education 
had increased dramatically. Yet with increasing 
industrialization and urbanization, the values 
formerly learned by children participating in 
community activities found a smaller place in 
social life outside the school. At the same time, 
for the most part schools have not responded in 
ways such that they provide adequate ways of 
gaining such values. It is striking how Dewey's 
argument in 1937 echoes that of LI, L2, School 
and Society, and the work of the Laboratory 
School. Here is the way he puts it in L3,17: "if 
the growing young are to get any first hand 
experience to a very large extent it is the school 
that has got to provide them, so that a good deal 
of the development of so-called industrial 
activities is not so much an immediate and direct 
industrial thing as it is to meet a larger human 
need of the individuals in getting the kind of 
education that the ordinary environment no 
longer supplies him." 
In Dewey's final lecture in the 1937 
course, he discusses education explicitly from a 
democratic frame of reference. In contrast to 
those who think of democracy mainly as a 
political institution, Dewey calls it "a moral-
social ideal," of which political democracy is one 
aspect. He quotes the title of Bode's book, 
Democracy as a Way of Life, as indicative of his 
own view that political democracy is a means to 
a wider democracy as a way of life. He points 
out that equality of opportunity is a fundamental 
ideal in a democratic way of life. Noting the 
often-raised criticism of this ideal on the ground 
that people are not born equal inasmuch as 
heredity makes a difference, Dewey responds by 
saying that the advocates of the ideal of equality 
meant "that people ought to have equality of 
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opportunity no matter what the inequalities in 
their natural gifts are." Indeed, he adds, "the 
more certain it is that there is inequality of 
natural gifts, then the more reason there is for 
having equality of opportunity of development." 
Dewey goes on to argue that the main 
advantage of political democracy "is that it is an 
educational procedure." By this he means the 
process by which political democracy achieves 
its results, including public discussion, with the 
aim of settling disputes through inquiry, 
consultation, and conference, instead of 
imposing authoritarian precepts and rules. Class 
distinctions, Dewey points out, set barriers 
against a democratic process in that each class 
tends "to live within itself instead of 
communicating with other groups. He suggests 
that certain words are worth thinking about in 
this connection, e.g., communication and 
community. For there to be communication, a 
community needs to exist in which certain aims 
are pursued in common. He adds racial groups 
to social distinctions as potential barriers or 
potential opportunities for community-building 
by saying: "The variety, the heterogeneity, of 
racial groups ought to contribute to a richer and 
fuller life instead of having all differences of 
tradition and culture wiped out in the effort to get 
uniformity." (So much for the "melting pot," and 
so much more for the idea of "cultural 
pluralism.") 
In discussing the place of vocational 
education in a democracy, Dewey argues for a 
"larger sense" of it. He means that individuals 
should not just be prepared for certain 
occupations apart from their participation in 
other dimensions of democratic life. Educators 
need to get away "from the idea that it is merely 
manual skill that is being developed to the idea 
that certain attitudes, capacities, forms of 
knowledge are being developed that will fit the 
individual . . . to choose wisely his line of 
occupational contact . . . and to engage 
thoughtfully and happily in life." Dewey puts 
this idea to work in the concluding remarks of 
the lecture by arguing that school organization 
and administration have been democratic less in 
practice than in theory; he adds that "it is hard to 
see" how students who are taking orders from 
others, as well as teachers who are "under more 
or less external control by administrators on the 
ground that they are not fitted or prepared to 
participate in selection and organization of 
materials and methods, are going to be effective 
educators of individuals for a democratic 
society." 
Conclusion 
Aside from the differences in approach to 
the subject of philosophy of education that have 
been noted between L3 and its predecessors ~ 
e.g., beginning the lectures by discussing 
philosophy and philosophy of education, not 
offering a formal definition of education — 
emphases held in common with LI, L2, and 
Democracy and Education are striking. Among 
them are the nature of interrelationships between 
organism and environment, between individual 
and social, between child and curriculum; the 
need to make democracy work as a way of life; 
the distinction between ends-in-view and ends 
achieved; and the necessity for life in schools to 
acknowledge the place of informal out-of-school 
activities in shaping the formal school subjects. 
At the same time, Dewey had 
experienced much in the four decades since LI 
and L2 and the two decades since Democracy 
and Education; and in 1937 a somewhat different 
world was very much with him. While in the 
earlier lectures and writings Dewey had taken 
care to point out the obstacles to a wider bringing 
to life of his educational ideas, in 1937 it is 
almost as if many of those obstacles had become 
engrained as part of an American way of life. 
World War I and its consequences, the economic 
depression of the 1930s, the threat to democracy 
by totalitarian states, and the hold of absolutistic 
values and standards on people's minds, all 
weighed heavily on Dewey's insistence that if 
one is not a philosophical absolutist one cannot 
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be an absolutist for peace, and his remarks about 
the undemocra t i c o rgan i za t i on and 
administration of schools and the authoritarian 
way in which teachers and students are treated. 
It will not do to attempt to characterize 
Dewey in those slippery terms, optimist or 
pessimist. He clearly has not lost hope in the 
possibilities of human beings learning how to 
make their own values and to test them by their 
own experience. Yet he seems more mindful in 
1937 than in 1896, 1899, and 1916 of the 
recalcitrance of real obstacles to that kind of 
learning and testing. 
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